Corporate governance in private equity : do boards really matter? : an empirical study of Norwegian private equity by Farran, Hadi & Lam, Kim-Alexander
Corporate Governance in Private Equity:
Do Boards Really Matter?
An empirical study of Norwegian private equity
Hadi Farran and Kim-Alexander Laˆm
Supervisor: Associate Professor Carsten Bienz
Master thesis in Financial Economics
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
Fall 2015
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration at
NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are responsible - through the approval
of this thesis - for the theories and methods used, or results and conclusions drawn in this work.

Corporate Governance in Private Equity:
Do Boards Really Matter?
Hadi Farran and Kim-Alexander Laˆm
December 21, 2015
Abstract
We examine how private equity funds a↵ect corporate governance in Norwegian portfolio
companies. We find that general partners do not prioritize the board as long as every-
thing is going according to plan. We also find that when a company is taken private CEO
turnover during the first year after the buyout is a matter of control change. Key factors
of keeping the sitting CEO is thus highly based on information not directly tied to per-
formance. Moving past this period into the monitoring period we find that performance
becomes important. However, general partners do not seem to influence decisions about
the CEO directly from the board. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the board is
being neglected and interaction between general partners and management is conducted
in alternative ways.
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1 Introduction
Do boards really contribute to corporate governance? Or are they simply an irrelevance
when it comes to how the company is structured and run? We set out to answer the
following research question: how do private equity funds a↵ect corporate governance in
Norwegian portfolio companies? We focus on three aspects: (i) General Partners on the
Board, (ii) CEO Turnover and (iii) Performance.
We run our analyzes on a data set we construct of Norwegian portfolio companies acquired
by private equity (PE) funds1 between 1999-2009. It is comprehensive and includes firm
specific information, CEO turnover and board composition. With 100 portfolio companies
we calculate descriptive statistics. However, as the availability of lagged performance
measures prior to the buyout were di cult to track, our final data set consists of 76
companies with complementary information.
In the first part we find that PE funds prefer having fewer general partners (GPs) on the
board when everything is going according to plan. Implicitly it means that the number
of GPs on the board may increase in the more challenging cases. The results are firstly
supported by the fact that co-investments between several PE funds do not demand more
GPs on the board. Their time is valuable as they could be working on other projects, hence
board positions do not seem to be emphasized. Secondly, changing the CEO shortly after
the buyout does not have an impact on board composition. This is presumably because
the PE firms undergo a thorough due diligence process prior to the buyout. Lastly, we
find some evidence that increasing leverage also increases GPs on the board. Whether
this is a matter of financial engineering or a monitoring device is unclear. Nevertheless,
the evidence is weak. In short, PE funds do not seem to prioritize board positions.
In the second part of our analysis we examine which factors PE firms consider regarding
CEO turnovers. We find that during the total holding period the main driver of a CEO
change is past performance. However, as we believe the timing of the CEO change may
provide further insight we divide the holding period into two sub periods - control and
monitoring. The control period is defined between the buyout announcement and the
1By construction, the PE funds are managed by the PE firms as shown in Figure 3. Thus we will use
PE firms and PE funds interchangeably.
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first year after the transaction. The monitoring period extends from the control period
until the PE fund exit2. Figure 1 gives an illustration of how the total period is divided
between the two.
Following our reasoning behind the timing of the turnovers, we find that a CEO change
during the control period is due to a control and ownership change and thus heavily
based on the preferences of the PE firms. A turnover suggests that the incumbent CEO
is not considered the appropriate candidate to lead the company through the needed
restructuring. The analysis shows that past performance does not a↵ect CEO control
changes. Leverage, on the other hand, seems to marginally explain some of these changes.
We argue that high levels of leverage aligns incentives between managers and owners.
This will in turn reduce the need for a control change, which is further supported by
several academics (Kaplan and Stro¨mberg, 2008; Gao, Harford, and Li, 2014).
Changing the CEO during the monitoring period is often a result of close monitoring. The
board, which oversees the CEO, is often divided into two types - internal and external
directors. External directors are members of the board who are not employed by - or
in any other way directly connected to - management. Subsequently, internal directors
are either employed, are major shareholders or are engaged in day-to-day operations
(Weisbach, 1988). As GPs are a mixture of internal and external directors, it is not
clear which factors GPs emphasize when monitoring the CEO. As internal directors they
can incorporate soft information3 when evaluating the CEO’s performance. On the other
hand, as external directors they also have equity stakes invested into the portfolio company
through their fund. As GPs ultimately want to achieve high returns to their investors
they should assess hard information4 as well. This is confirmed in the analysis, implying
that GPs rely heavily on past performance. We also find that co-investments tend to
increase the probability of a CEO change during the monitoring period. This imply that
the CEO has to fulfill additional requirements from the PE funds that are involved. The
results strengthen our suspicion regarding the analysis of GPs on the board.
2Or at the latest to 2013 as our data ends at that year.
3We define soft information as subjective information that is not easily measured. For instance
personal characteristics, charisma, leadership style etc.
4We define hard information as unbiased information that is easily measured. For instance financial
statements, key figures, profitability analyzes etc.
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In the third and last part of our analysis we conclude that PE funds ignore the board and
its formal functions. The findings do not reveal any specific link between value creation
and the presence of GPs on the board. Nonetheless we find support documented from
earlier studies that there is value creation in PE. We argue that interaction happens
directly between GPs and management, thus aligning incentives, as potential agency cost
may inflict substantial damage. This argument is supported by the advantageous e↵ect
that CEOs no longer have the opportunity of withholding information, which may hurt
owners.
Methodologically we run fixed e↵ects models for our board and CEO regressions where
standard errors are clustered on firm level. Additionally we briefly discuss whether clus-
tering on industry would be more e cient. Consequently by following a conservative
approach we end up with the fixed e↵ects model. When examining performance we need
to address the endogeneity problem which arises. Three types of endogeneity problems
are accounted for: unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity and the one that arises from
the possibility that current values of governance variables are a function of past firm per-
formance (Wintoki, Linck, and Netter, 2012). To adjust for this we run a static model, a
dynamic model, and a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) model. The choice and reasoning
behind the econometric methods used in the respective regressions are discussed in section
5.
To summarize, we assess three areas. Firstly, we assess board composition with respect
to GPs. Secondly, we examine what motivates CEO turnovers during the involvement
of a PE firm and contribute to the literature on CEO turnover. Thirdly, we assess how
PE involvement a↵ects performance and whether it is through board positions. In total
our results suggest that Norwegian PE funds ignore board positions and interact directly
with management when restructuring the portfolio companies.
Common for all three contributions is that they add insight to the PE literature in terms
of corporate governance. This has historically been di cult to address as the industry is
opaque, making information and data collection di cult.
7
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the basic concepts
within the PE industry and how the funds are structured. Section 3 provides a literature
review where we document earlier studies done within the relevant areas in order to answer
our research question. Section 4 presents how the data set was constructed. Section 5
presents the analyzes where each part contain relevant summary statistics, methodology
and our regression results. Section 6 addresses limitations and suggestions for future
studies. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Private Equity
At the simplest level private equity is a medium or long-term equity investment that is
not publicly traded on an exchange (Cendrowski and Wadecki, 2012). It is often referred
to as an alternative asset class pooled within a fund and invested in private companies.
Figure 2 shows an overview of the two main segments within PE which is Venture Capital
and Leveraged Buyouts.
Venture Capital (VC) invest in start-up and growth companies. These companies often
have high technological risk and high R&D expenses. Furthermore, they usually need
to undergo investments in equipment, intellectual property and more generally fixed as-
sets (Demaria, 2013). VC contribute by giving access to capital markets, expertise and
experience.
A Leveraged Buyout (LBO) is usually an acquisition of a mature company using leverage.
Companies undergoing an LBO transaction have a history of strong earnings. However,
due to factors such as poor management or market conditions these companies are not
performing at par.
2.1 Private Equity Funds
Metrick and Yasuda (2011) define PE funds based on four specific characteristics. Firstly,
a PE fund is a financial intermediary, meaning that it manage investors’ capital and invest
directly in portfolio companies. Secondly, a PE fund invest only in private companies.
This means that once the investments are made, the companies cannot be immediately
traded on a public exchange. Thirdly, a PE fund takes an active role in monitoring and
helping the companies in its portfolio. Lastly, a PE fund’s primary goal is to maximize its
financial return by exiting investments through a sale or an initial public o↵ering (IPO).
Figure 3 gives an overview of how the funds are structured and how the di↵erent entities
are connected. The funds are organized as a limited partnership between GPs and Limited
Partners (LPs) (Cendrowski and Wadecki, 2012).
GPs represent the PE firm and act as sole managers of the fund. The GPs contribute to
the fund through their managerial skills and market expertize (Kaplan and Stro¨mberg,
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2008). They are compensated in three ways. The first way being a fixed fee which is a
percentage of capital committed. The second way is through “carried interest”, which
GPs are entitled to as long as the fund generates a profit exceeding a specified threshold.
This interest usually equals about 20% of the generated profits. Thirdly some GPs charge
deal fees and monitoring fees to the companies in which they invest.
LPs, the investors, consist of a variety of entities such as corporations, banks, insurance
companies, pension funds, foundations, sovereign wealth funds and university endow-
ments. The investments are done at the discretion of the GPs, whom investors trust their
capital (Weisbach, Axelson, and Stro¨mberg, 2007). The LPs are by definition not able
to influence the day-to-day operation of the fund as it may repeal their limited liability
status.
2.2 Norwegian Private Equity
Norwegian PE funds have historically targeted small to mid capitalization companies.
From the mid 80s the primary focus was towards information and communication tech-
nology companies, but has since shifted its focus towards oil and gas dominated companies.
The industry has experienced increased growth during the last decade, where capital un-
der management has grown from 7.5 BNOK in 2001 to 61.0 BNOK in 2011 (Hognestad,
2011). Buyouts account for approximately 33.8 BNOK and consist of about 13 Norwegian
PE firms. This is where the PE industry has experienced highest growth in recent years.
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3 Literature Review
The literature on corporate governance is extensive. It addresses the dynamic relation-
ship between owners and management. Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) were one of
the first to study the relationship between stock return and changes to top management.
They find an inverse relationship between stock performance and CEO turnover implying
that weak performance leads to CEO turnover. This issue has further been examined as
academics try to distinguish monitoring di↵erences between two types of board members
- internal and external directors. Weisbach (1988) was one of the first to specifically ex-
amine external directors sensitivity to performance compared to internal directors. He
finds that external directors on the board to a greater extent emphasize performance mea-
surements. He further questions whether internal directors are more cautious in opposing
the sitting CEO as their career is highly dependent of the CEO. Additionally, Adams
and Ferreira (2007) suggest that independent boards, i.e. boards mainly consisting of
external directors, monitor management more intensively. In their model they illustrate
a situation where the CEO faces a paradox regarding information sharing. On one side,
if the CEO shares his information to the board, they will be better informed and their
advice more well-founded. On the other side, as the CEO shares information he might
also reveal sensitive information about his own performance jeopardizing his future in the
company. This is further supported by Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) who examine
the evolution of how boards are composed in terms of internal and external directors.
They find that the use of external board members result in an increase in CEO turnover.
Part of the issue regarding corporate governance, especially monitoring of management,
has its origin from the renowned Principal-Agent problem5. The problem arises when
two parties have di↵erent interests and asymmetric information, the agent having more
information. Thus, the principal cannot directly ensure that the agent is always acting
in the principal’s best interest (Eisenhardt, 1989). Consequently academics have tried to
find e cient tools in order to mitigate the agency problem. For instance, Jensen (1986)
finds that leverage solves the problem by forcing management to commit free cash flows
to service debt. This e↵ectively prevents investments in value decreasing projects.
5Referred to as the agency problem.
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Most research regarding corporate governance and agency problems is based on public
companies. Nonetheless the majority of the literature is directly applicable to the PE
industry. For instance, Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2008) find that the use of leverage mit-
igates agency problems in LBOs, supporting Jensen’s (1986) findings. Further, several
studies compare public against private companies regarding the e↵ect of changes in cor-
porate governance. According to Gao et al. (2014), CEOs who induce high agency costs
are replaced within the first two years of an LBO announcement. They also show that
boards are more likely to remove incumbent CEOs if pre-LBO ROAs are low. On the
other hand some academics claim that GPs replacing external directors after an LBO
cause fewer CEO turnovers (Cornelli and Karakas¸, 2013). These results suggest that
more inside information and e↵ective monitoring allow GPs to assess CEOs’ performance
over a longer horizon relative to comparable public companies. Hence this should reduce
CEO turnover.
The literature concerning PE firms’ ability to improve performance is mixed. Kaplan
and Stro¨mberg (2008) distinguish between three types of changes PE firms implement
in portfolio companies to improve performance: financial, governance, and operational
engineering. The most common one being financial engineering, which is changes to the
capital structure. Governance engineering concerns control of the board and levels of
involvement. Operational engineering is adding value by industry and market expertize.
Wright, Amess, Weir, and Girma (2009) find some evidence indicating that UK buyouts
between 1998-2004 increased operational performance in the respective portfolio compa-
nies. On the other hand, Gao et al. (2014) find marginal evidence of improved operating
performance. In short, there seem to be a consensus that PE firms do improve perfor-
mance, but the significance of it seem to be more ambiguous and di cult to prove.
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4 Data
We have constructed a new set of data where we track Norwegian portfolio companies
acquired by PE funds through buyouts between 1999-2009. Following firm specific in-
formation, CEO turnover and the equivalent board size and composition, the data set
should be comprehensive. The time period was carefully chosen as information before
1999 was di cult to obtain and available information after 2009 only extends to 2013 in
our available data. The final data set consist of 100 companies for statistical summary
and 76 companies for the regressions.
4.1 Identifying Buyouts and the Holding Period
We received a data set from the Argentum Centre for Private Equity6 (ACPE). Here we
had to exclude all venture and seed investments as well as deals before 1999. We were
fortunate to receive a complementary list of 233 deals from an earlier thesis written by
Hilde Karine Sæberg and Ole Kristan Lohnaas (2014). This is arguably the most complete
list of deals in Norway as it supplements and enhances the ACPE database.
To identify the right entry and exit dates of the PE funds we used data received from
ACPE. The holding period is defined as the period between the entry and exit given there
is a PE fund invested in the portfolio company. Subsequently a secondary buyout between
two PE funds still count as one holding period. The rationale behind this assumption is
that PE funds wish to obtain the same thing - the highest return possible. Unfortunately,
many of the entry and exit dates were missing and in certain cases in conflict with what
the PE funds announced themselves. For instance, according to Herkules’ homepage, they
exited Bandak AS in 2010, while in the ACPE database the exit was in 2009 (Herkules,
2015). Hence, we had to control for this in order to improve the validity of the data set.
Of the 100 portfolio companies 52 have been exited.
6The Argentum Centre for Private Equity is a research centre concentrating on Private Equity, based
at Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) in Bergen, Norway. The centre’s mission is to produce objective
research of the highest quality on all topics related to Nordic Private Equity.
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4.2 Firm Specific Information
Identifying the right company is crucial. Having read previous theses, the use of organi-
zational numbers in order to find the right companies seem somewhat inconsistent. This
is a common problem in the field of PE as information is limited. Thus, quality assurance
was conducted in two ways. Firstly, we contacted the PE firms requesting the correct
organizational numbers, assuring whether it was a seed or venture and if there were any
additional information to account for. For instance, CyberWatcher is according to ACPE
defined as a buyout transaction, but Joakim Bredahl (personal communication October
17, 2015) at Verdane Capital informed us that it in fact was a venture. Those who did not
respond were quality checked by extensive online research. Secondly, we had to ensure
that the GPs were represented on the relevant boards linked to the correct organizational
number.
Firm specific information was mainly gathered from the SNF database (SNF, 2015)7. As
SNF only have financial figures to 2013, this is where our data set ends. Finding firm
specific information as firm size, leverage and return on assets (ROA) were easily obtained
when organizational numbers were consistent. When they were not, we made extensive
use of Ravn (RavnInfo, 2015) and Pro↵ Forvalt (Forvalt, 2015) in order to retrieve the
remaining financial figures8.
However, ownership structures tend to become complex after a buyout, hence this proved
to be a challenge when gathering information. Especially prior to the buyouts when we
wanted to find lagged performance measures. For instance, Sonans was merged with Aktiv
Opplæring in the buyout of 1999 under the name Sonans, making the companies more
di cult to track prior to the buyout.
7SNF is part of NHH dedicated to the task of initiating and undertaking contract research.
8Ravn, short for RavnInfo, and Pro↵ Forvalt are both web pages that provide corporate information
on Norwegian corporations. Access was provided by the library at NHH.
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4.3 Board Composition and CEO turnover
After identifying the right organizational numbers, CEO turnover as well as total board
size was next in order to identify GPs. Board composition was tracked one year prior to
the buyout until an exit or the last year of data. Complex organizational structures proved
again to be challenging as some companies are used as “shell companies” for tax purposes.
These structures may change over the years and thus it was important to find the relevant
board. We received a data set from Aksel Mjøs9 tracking board composition and CEOs
for private companies in Norway between 1998-201310. Furthermore we received a data
set from Associate Professor Carsten Bienz11, displaying GPs in Scandinavian PE funds.
Board composition was examined once a year.
As another measure of quality assurance we tracked all board members by online searches.
LinkedIn (LinkedIn.com, 2015) was helpful as GPs rarely keep their success stories to
themselves.
4.4 Holding Period and Firm Specific Statistics
The mean (median) holding period is 3.14 (3.00). Our longest observed holding period is
13 years. This is in contrast to Cornelli and Karakas¸ (2013), who observe a mean holding
period of 4.5 years in their sample. PE funds in general have holding periods ranging
from three to seven years (Stowell, 2012). When looking at exited buyouts, the mean
(median) holding period is reduced to 2.08 (2.00). As most of the companies in our data
are located in the small-/mid- cap market, one could expect that the period needed to
restructure the company may be shorter.
A common way to calculate leverage is by dividing total debt by total firm value. However,
we calculate leverage by dividing total debt by total assets due to potential financial
9Aksel Mjøs is a postdoctor at The Department of Finance and Management Science at NHH. His
research is in the field of financing of corporates, in particular bank loans and other forms of debt
financing.
10The data on non-executive board of directors and chief executive o cers in Norwegian companies
is provided by the Brønnøysund Registry Centre (www.brreg.no) and comes from each company’s own
reporting of individual o cers.
11Carsten Bienz is an Associate Professor of Finance at the NHH, where he teaches Private Equity.
His main research interests include Corporate Finance, Private Equity, Fixed Income, and the Economics
of Contracts.
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restructuring after the buyout. This is also done by Cornelli and Karakas¸ (2013). The
mean and median is 0.72.
Industry is divided into six sub categories. Consumption, Energy, Health Care, Informa-
tion and Communication Technology (ICT), Industrial and Other.
In the analysis we use a set of variables describing certain characteristics of the PE
fund. These, among other regression variables, are found in table 1 with appropriate
explanation.
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5 Analysis
In this part we present our findings in order to answer the research question. The analysis
is divided into GPs on the Board, CEO Turnover and Performance. Each part contains
descriptive statistics, the applied methodology and the results.
5.1 Board
5.1.1 Board Statistics
The average board size in our sample is 5.52 for all periods. The GPs represent 1.71
which is approximately 33% of the board seats. In some cases we observe GPs entering
the board before the transaction as illustrated in Figure 4. The figure shows how the
board and its composition change in di↵erent periods. According to Yermak (1996) and
Cornelli and Karakas¸ (2013), better corporate governance is maintained by decreasing the
total board size when taken private. Both papers find a reduction of approximately 15%,
but in our case board size on average increase by 14%. This is an interesting result and
will later be addressed.
5.1.2 Board Methodology
GPs assist, manage and consult the portfolio companies supposedly through board po-
sitions. We want to examine and analyze which factors explain the GPs on the board.
Hence, this will be the dependent variable explained by a set of firm, governance and
fund specific independent variables. In order to run the best estimated regression we
have to consider potential econometric issues which might arise. Using panel data we
account for changes in entities observed across time, which in our case are the portfolio
companies. Commonly used methods as the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) may
ignore the structure of the panel data and hence give biased results (Wooldridge, 2010).
Other methods often applied to panel data is the fixed e↵ects (FE) and random e↵ects
(RE) specifications. By applying FE one is interested in controlling for time-invariant
observations within companies that are di cult to measure. This method will to some
extent account for omitted variable bias (OVB). Each company is treated individually,
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therefore their error term and the constant should be uncorrelated with the other com-
panies. If the error terms are correlated, FE is not the preferred model. On the other
hand, RE models assume that variation in the companies is a matter of random events
and hence uncorrelated with the independent variable(s). A way of testing this is by
applying the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2010), which in short tests whether
the error term is correlated with the independent variable. After running the test we
reject the null hypothesis and use the FE model. This test is consistently run for all
the regressions throughout the thesis. Additionally we add year dummies to control for
temporal variation as macroeconomic e↵ects. As robustness we include OLS to compare
our results.
Standard errors are clustered by company in all regressions. As FE adjust for the e↵ect
of OVB within each company, it does not fully capture the possible correlation between
portfolio companies within the respective industries. We thus control for this by clustering
standard errors on industry. However, as we only have six categories of industry our results
may su↵er of ”overfitting”. This would make the estimated residuals systematically too
close to zero compared to the true error terms. In deciding what to cluster, we chose
a conservative approach using the model with the highest standard errors, which was
clustering by company (Cameron and Miller, 2015).
5.1.3 Board Regression Results
A general presumption is that the board plays an important role in organizations. To
help answer the research question we set out to explore what determines GPs on the
board. Identifying these determinants might contribute in understanding how PE firms
alter corporate governance.
Exit is a measure of success. In Table 3 Exit is significant on a 1% level with a negative
coe cient. Keeping all other factors constant, an exit reduce GPs on the board by 12.1%.
Assuming PE firms conduct a detailed due diligence prior to a buyout they already have
an impression of which changes are needed in order to successfully exit the company.
Consequently they use as few GPs as possible when everything is going according to plan.
On the other hand this could imply that GPs may become more present in investments
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they expect to be more complex and thus harder to exit. For instance, if the portfolio
company is experiencing a downturn due to unforeseen factors, GPs would oversee the
company closer.
Leverage is another significant variable but only marginally on a 10% level. Keeping all
factors constant an increase in leverage increase GPs on the board by 4.42%. Leverage in
the literature is mostly mentioned in the context of financial engineering and for monitor-
ing management. As monitoring, leverage mitigates agency problems between the board
and management (Mu¨ller and Panunzi, 2003; Kaplan and Stro¨mberg, 2008; Grinstein,
2006). By increasing leverage, closer monitoring may be required in order to prevent the
company of going into financial distress. Thus the increase in GPs on the board can
be seen as a proactive measure of keeping the firm on the right track. With respect to
financial engineering, the goal is to improve the capital structure. It is carried out as the
GPs apply their hands-on experience and connections in order to get access to capital.
This may be done by underwriting bonds and negotiating bank loans.
PE funds co-investing in portfolio companies is insignificant. One would expect a positive
relationship between the number of PE funds invested and the GPs represented on the
board. However, in our case such a relationship does not seem to exist, although our
descriptive statistics show increasing board size after the buyout. A sensible explanation
is that the PE firms bring in experts from di↵erent fields of business to strengthen the
company where it is lacks expertize (Gao et al., 2014).
Replacing the CEO during the control period is insignificant and should be discussed.
One would expect this variable to have two plausible e↵ects on GPs on the board. On
one hand, when the PE firm replace the CEO the need for close monitoring diminishes
as the new CEO presumably acts in the interest of the PE firm. On the other hand, the
act of replacing the CEO during the control period itself is a sign that the investment
may be challenging. This would imply that more board monitoring is needed, hence more
GPs may be expected to become present on the board. Nonetheless, we find that a CEO
change during the control period does not explain GPs on the board.
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5.1.4 Board Summary
In the previous paragraphs we explored which factors a↵ect GPs on the board. Our
results suggest that PE funds prefer having few GPs on the board when everything is
going according to plan. Implicitly GPs on the board may increase in challenging cases or
when something unexpected happens. An example of this is an economical downturn. Our
results find support from two aspects. Firstly, the co-investment variable which indicated
that PE funds do not seem to demand more GPs on the board when investing together.
Secondly, changing the CEO during the control period does not have an e↵ect. We find
evidence that leverage increase GPs on the board, however, evidence is weak. In short,
PE funds do not seem to put much emphasis on board positions.
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5.2 CEO
5.2.1 CEO Statistics
In our list of 100 buyouts, 19 companies did not undergo a CEO turnover. Table 2 shows
that in the remaining 81 companies the total CEO turnover is 154. This gives an average
turnover rate of 1.54. As mentioned in the introduction we separate the holding period
into two sub periods, namely the control period and the monitoring period (Figure 1). 52
turnovers are categorized as a CEO control change. Nine portfolio companies have had
more than one CEO turnover during the control period. Changing the CEO two times is
an unexpected result as one would believe a single change would be su cient during the
first year. Conclusively, a CEO control change is observed in 43%12 of all deals, which is in
line with findings done by Cornelli and Karakas¸ (2013), Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn, and
Kehoe (2013) and Gao et al. (2014) who find rates of 52.3%, 39% and 51% respectively.
The remaining 102 CEO turnovers are categorized as a monitoring change. 63 of the 100
companies experienced at least one monitoring change. Of the 52 companies who had
a control change, 34 also had a monitoring change. Basically, this means that in 34%13
of the times there is a change in both periods. The results are surprising as one would
expect a control change to be su cient in order to get the portfolio company on the right
track. Especially when taking the short holding period we observe into consideration (see
section 4.4).
The total average CEO turnover rate during the holding period is 11%14. This is in line
with Cornelli and Karakas¸ (2013) findings of 9.2% following an LBO. Interestingly, this is
a lower rate compared to public companies which was documented by Kaplan and Minton
(2012) to be 15.8% between 1992 and 2007.
120.43 = (52 9)100
130.34 = 34100
140.11 = 1.5413
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5.2.2 CEO Methodology
Turnover analyzes are often based on stock price performance, which is not possible in
our case as we assess private companies. We run FE with year dummies as our main
model and test for robustness with OLS, similar to what was done in section 5.1. The
dependent variable is a binary variable (dummy variable) which takes the value of 1 if
there has been a CEO turnover in the respective year of observation. We use ROA as a
performance measurement with other independent variables. In contrast, Weisbach (1988)
and Cornelli and Karakas¸ (2013) apply logit regressions. Although this method in some
cases might be useful, they are often di cult to interpret in terms of coe cients, modeling
interactions between variables and measures of model fit (Hoetker, 2007). Tables four to
six show our CEO turnover analysis. The regressions are separated into total CEO change,
CEO control change and CEO monitoring change.
5.2.3 CEO Regression Results
Moving forward we assess determinants taken into consideration when there is a CEO
turnover. This is done in three steps with three di↵erent analyzes. Firstly, we examine
which factors are relevant for a CEO change during the total holding period. Next, we
examine turnovers during the control period. Lastly, we explore what a↵ects the decision
of changing the CEO during the monitoring period.
In the first analysis we examine CEO changes during the total holding period. We use
ROAt-1 as we believe that last period’s performance is better suited to evaluate the qual-
ity of the current CEO. In the regression output in Table 4 ROAt-1 and NORPE are
significant. The coe cient of ROAt-1 is negative and significant at a 1% level. Keeping
all other factors constant a one unit increase in last year’s performance reduces the prob-
ability of a CEO change during the total holding period by 26.9%. This imply that PE
firms emphasize hard information, i.e. measurable data, when assessing whether or not
to keep the CEO.
NORPE is significant at a 5% level with a positive coe cient. If a Norwegian PE fund is
involved, the probability of a CEO change increases by approximately 30.7%. This could
be explained by geographical distance between the PE firm and the portfolio company.
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According to Chemmanur, Hull, and Krishnan (2014) PE firms are able to monitor port-
folio companies more e↵ectively when they are closer to their investments. This imply
that Norwegian PE firms are able to carry out more precise decisions regarding the CEO
during the holding period. Additionally it is possible that Norwegian PE firms benefit
from a networking e↵ect as GPs and CEOs of portfolio companies may have crossed paths
before and thus have a professional relation.
In the second analysis we assess CEO changes during the control period. The regression
output is shown in Table 5. It seems sensible that ROAt-1 is not statistically significant. As
this is a change within the first year of the buyout, GPs neglect the sitting managements’
past performance. The change is as a result outside the CEO’s control and a matter of
preference from the PE firms. This strengthens our belief that timing of CEO turnover
matters.
Leverage is marginally significant at a 10% level with a negative coe cient. Although the
evidence is weak, it is in line with the findings of Gong and Wu (2011). They observe a
negative relationship between pre-LBO levels of leverage and the probability of a CEO
turnover. They argue that companies with low levels of leverage before an LBO are
subject to high agency costs due to management’s access to high undistributed free cash
flows. Consequently, companies with high levels of leverage are able to mitigate these
agency problems. This in turn reduces the probability of changing the incumbent CEO
after an LBO.
In the third analysis we focus on CEO changes during the monitoring period. As the
PE firm observe the CEO over a certain period of time they are better suited to assess
the skills of the CEO. We would therefore expect CEO changes occurring in this period
to be explained by past performance measurements among other factors. The regression
output for CEO monitoring is found in Table 6 where ROAt-1, CoInvest and GP CEO are
significant.
ROAt-1 is statistically significant at a 1% level, as opposed to the results from the CEO
control regression. A one unit increase in past performance would thus reduce the proba-
bility of a CEO turnover by 31.2%. This coincides with the common presumption about
e↵ective board monitoring, past performance and decisions regarding the sitting CEO
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(Weisbach, 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Jenter and Lewellen, 2010; Kaplan and
Minton, 2012). The general consensus is that the GPs on the board are often considered
as a mixture of internal and external directors. As internal directors, GPs take part in
daily operations of the firm. This enables them to obtain subjective soft information,
i.e. unmeasurable data, regarding the CEO. On the other hand, GPs are also external
directors as their fund is invested into the portfolio company through equity stakes. This
is in favour of close monitoring based on unbiased performance measurement as the fund
ultimately want to achieve high returns to their LPs. Since this is their main objective,
GPs seem to prioritize performance measures over soft information.
Co-investment by several PE funds is significant at a 5% level. This implies that if there
are more than one PE fund invested in the portfolio company, all else equal, the probability
of a CEO turnover increases by 17.3%. One way of seeing this is that each PE firm would
have a set of criteria the CEO would have to fulfill. On the other hand, as seen in section
5.1.3, the same variable does not have any explanatory power on the observed GPs on
the board. Hence, it would seem as the respective PE funds involved are able to express
their opinion about the CEO without necessarily holding o cial board positions.
Appointing a GP as CEO (GP CEO) for the portfolio company e↵ectively removes the
distance between management and owners as it becomes one unit. Significant at a 1%
level with a negative coe cient implies that, all else equal, if a GP is appointed CEO it
will reduce the probability of a CEO turnover by 14.4%. This seems reasonable as a PE
firm would not fire one of their own. GPs bring managerial experience to the portfolio
company, thus a potential decline in firm performance would believably be attributed to
other factors outside his control. This suggest that a preferred governance model within
the PE industry is to appoint the GP as the intermediate CEO during the restructuring.
However, GP’s time is valuable and expensive as it could be used on other projects,
inferring that it is not optimal. The results are therefore ambiguous and one should be
careful to draw any conclusions.
In the previous paragraphs we assessed each of the three regressions separately with their
respective results. We will now comment on specific variables we argue deserves a second
look. From the total CEO change regression NORPE was significant. After we divided
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the data into two sub sets NORPE was not significant in neither the control period nor
the monitoring period. Hence this may indicate that the divided samples have become too
small and thus do not capture the full e↵ect. However, as discussed we believe examining
geographical matters may reveal some interesting aspects in the Norwegian PE market.
Common for the three regressions is the insignificance of GPs on the board. In general
our regression results indicate that GPs represented through board positions do not have
any particular importance for a CEO turnover. We find this result counter intuitive as
one would assume the decision regarding CEO changes to require the board’s acceptance.
In most cases the PE funds are the majority shareholders meaning that they e↵ectively
can make decisions without the total board’s approval. The board would basically be a
formal organ bound by law rather than an actual corporate channel for supervision and
monitoring. The increase in total board members we observe after the buyout (see section
5.1.1) might therefore be explained by a cluster of experts the PE funds bring in to assist
the restructuring. This has previously been discussed in the analysis in section 5.1.3.
5.2.4 CEO Summary
In this section we explored what a↵ects CEO turnover in a portfolio company. Our data
were divided into two subsets defined as control period and monitoring period. In the
control period a CEO turnover seems not to be a matter of past performance but rather
preferences of the PE firms. On the contrary, a CEO turnover in the monitoring period
seems to be highly determined based on performance. The involved GPs have an unique
position as they function as a mixture of internal and external directors on the board.
However, we find no evidence of GPs on the board explaining CEO turnovers. If this
is the case, boards would only be a formal organ bound by law rather than an actual
corporate channel for supervision and monitoring.
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5.3 Performance
5.3.1 Performance Statistics
ROA is derived by dividing total operating income by total assets. The mean is negative
3% for the total data set. When examining the data we find Meditron ASA as an outlier
with a negative ROA of 1900% in one of the periods. Disregarding the outlier increases
the mean to 0%. Additionally, adjusting for bankruptcies, which are observed in five
cases, we get a mean of 1%.
5.3.2 Performance Methodology
Most of the literature concerning corporate governance examine how managerial and
structural changes a↵ect performance. We want to examine the link between changes to
corporate governance and growth in portfolio companies. However, due to issues regarding
endogeneity, the choice of method varies as researchers try to overcome these problems.
Academics usually recognize two possible sources of endogeneity: unobservable hetero-
geneity and simultaneity. However, according to Wintoki et al. (2012) there is another
source of endogeneity often ignored. More specifically, the one that arises from the possi-
bility that current values of governance variables are a function of past firm performance.
In order to analyze performance in a consistent and robust manner, we present several
methods as done by Wintoki et al. (2012) and Chang and Zhang (2013). We start by
running a static FE model with year dummies merely for comparison reasons. As this
model neglects issues regarding endogeneity the regressors will be biased. Next, we trans-
form our model into a dynamic model by lagging the dependent variable and use it as
an independent variable. By doing this we control for past performance. In addition, the
FE specification should to some extent control for unobservable heterogeneity. Finally,
we introduce a simultaneous equation model, the 2SLS, to address issues regarding simul-
taneity. This model is an extension of the OLS method and is used when the independent
variable(s) and the error term of the dependent variable are correlated (Wooldridge, 2010).
Executed in two steps, the first is to find an instrument for the variables which su↵er from
simultaneity while not being correlated with the error term. The second stage is simply to
substitute the instrument for the variable. Hence, the first stage equation requires a valid
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instrument. Following the reasoning of Cornelli and Karakas¸ (2013) our choice of instru-
ment for GPs on the board is the percentage of external directors on the board prior to the
buyout - Outsiders. They argue that external directors prior to an LBO can be used as a
measure of firm complexity. Assuming that this complexity is the same before and after
the LBO, it should not directly a↵ect the change in CEO turnover. Subsequently it serves
as a proxy for di culties regarding monitoring and advising the firm. The importance of
finding a strong instrument is crucial. Unfortunately the instrument was not significant
in our analysis hence weakening the reliability of the model. Thus, we use the dynamic
model with FE as our main model, but estimate the 2SLS, for comparison, knowing it
will be biased. Model specification is further elaborated in section 6.
5.3.3 Performance Regression Results
The literature shows that PE firms generally enhance performance. Friedrich (2015) finds
in his master thesis a positive e↵ect on performance in Norwegian buyouts. He examine
buyouts between 1996-2009 which confirms that there is value creation15. In this section
we examine if there are any apparent links between corporate governance and performance.
As seen in the regression output in Table 7 none of the variables significantly explain any
of the variation observed in ROA. Basically this implies two things. On one hand, the
choice of model may lack power and hence be inadequate. On the other hand, the model is
applicable but with no significant results. Having thoroughly assessed and chosen a model,
given the data set, we believe the latter is the appropriate explanation. As GPs on the
board is insignificant it suggests that this channel does not necessarily induce operational
growth. As we know, boards function as final reviewers in terms of operating and financial
decisions. If one assumes that PE funds have determined which changes to undergo
in order to improve the portfolio company, the board could become negligible. This is
consistent with our findings in the board regression analysis where successful exits decrease
GPs on the board. It implies that board positions are ignored in less challenging cases.
Subsequently it is also consistent with our findings in the CEO regression analysis where
co-investments increase CEO turnover during the monitoring period but not through
15Other theses also suggest value creation, see for instance Gulliksen, Wara, and Hansen (2008) and
Andresen and Sandnes (2009).
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board positions. This would indicate that board positions are not prioritized. By removing
the link between the board and management, the two entities would merge into one as
the GPs are represented on the board while actively assisting management. The logical
question that follows is therefore; if not from board positions then what channels do PE
funds use to induce operational growth? In the next paragraph we o↵er a brief discussion
on an alternative channel. But, due to the lack of statistical support from our regressions,
this might be of a speculative nature.
For most businesses maximizing profits is the main objective. Optimizing corporate gov-
ernance provides the foundation of a successful organization. Acharya et al. (2013) find
that GPs interact directly with management often multiple times a week through formal
and informal channels during the holding period. We believe this is the preferred gover-
nance model within PE as agency problems are value decreasing if not carefully assessed.
Quickly after the transaction GPs join management in order to e ciently improve op-
erational and financial aspects of the portfolio company. As mentioned in the literature
review, CEOs might have incentives to withhold information (Adams and Ferreira, 2007).
Working closely together reduces the problem of asymmetric information between the two
entities. Whether this dilemma is solved by closer monitoring or other factors is unclear.
Nevertheless it should not matter as it mitigates agency problems either way. Another
argument supporting reduced agency problems is that PE funds often make customised
incentive systems for management (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2013). These systems
prioritize subjective performance evaluation while having low emphasis on relative indus-
try performance. In short, this should motivate management to perform at their best and
act in the interest of the PE firm.
5.3.4 Performance Summary
In this section we explored the link between changes in corporate governance and firm
performance in portfolio companies. Results suggest that PE funds ignore the board and
its formal functions and prefer fewer GPs present on the board if possible. Hence, we
argue that interaction between the PE firms and the portfolio companies occur directly
between GPs and management. This should in turn remove agency costs and further
align incentives between owners and management.
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6 Limitations and Future Studies
While working we quickly realized two specific challenges: Data availability and the ap-
plication of the correct econometric methods.
The first challenge is a well known problem in PE related papers. Private companies
are not required to disclose the same amount of information as public companies. Thus,
financial figures become less reliable and harder to track. Especially when examining
buyouts. The first year after a transaction is often characterized by restructuring in
terms of mergers and/or divestitures. Obtaining financial measures as well as corporate
governance specific information, i.e. board members before the buyout, was a challenge,
and in some cases not possible.
We mainly used the ACPE database, but in many cases it lacked necessary information.
For instance, fund information which we were unable to track online was removed. Con-
clusively the final data set is as comprehensive as we could make it, but would optimally
benefit from more observations.
The second challenge is a renowned topic in the literature of corporate governance and
PE. The problem with finding the best model is addressing potential endogeneity which
may exist. Several papers apply a 2SLS model in order to overcome these issues. In our
case, the choice of instrument which is an important condition for applying the model, was
statistically inadequate. Identifying alternative instruments is not an easy task as they
need to be economically justified. Optimally we wanted to use the Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM). This method is said to be the best in order to address problems
regarding endogeneity in panel data. GMM fits situations where the data is characterized
of having many individual observations (large N) but over a short period of time (small
T) (Wintoki et al., 2012). However, as the method requires historical measures, often
four to ten years, it was not possible for us to implement. Especially as we are assessing
buyouts within a certain period of time.
It is also important to mention the drawbacks by consistently using FE in all our models.
If the variation within the companies are constant it will omit this variation. This can in
turn reduce the overall signal from the data. However, as we are confident that there is
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OVB the use of FE is necessary.
Another problem we had to address was how to cluster the standard errors. The choice
was between clustering on industry level or company level. But as we only categorized the
portfolio companies into six di↵erent industries, concerns about too few clusters arose. We
therefore chose a conservative approach and used the model with highest standard errors,
which is supported by Cameron and Miller (2015). This dilemma could have been avoided
if we had more companies and subsequently more industries to cluster. Nonetheless, we
believe our justifications and choice of models yield a reliable result given our data set.
We would also like to point out that the variable CEO Control Change is included in the
Board regression (Table 3) as an independent variable. The same variable is then used
as a dependent variable in the CEO Control Change regression with GPs on the Board
as an independent variable (Table 5). This could give rise to an endogeneity issue, but
as the sample for the two regressions are di↵erent we argue that this will not be of any
major concern.
For future studies it would be interesting to investigate more closely which channel GPs
use. We made a discussion on an alternative channel which was of a somewhat speculative
sort. Uncovering the channel that PE firms use with proper empirical analyzes might
complement our thesis and perhaps give a clearer picture of how they are able to induce
growth.
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7 Conclusion
In this thesis we set out to answer the following research question: how do private equity
funds a↵ect corporate governance in Norwegian portfolio companies? As the industry is
opaque and data gathering is challenging this field of literature is still not fully explored.
We composed a new set of data consisting of firm and board specific information on
Norwegian buyout companies between 1999-2009. The research question was addressed
by looking at three distinct parts consisting of GPs on the Board, CEO Turnover and
finally Performance.
The main empirical findings are summarized within the respective chapters in the analysis
section. The results suggest that PE firms neglect the board and interact directly with
management. This is an unconventional interference from owners, but believably the
preferred governance model in order to restructure the portfolio company. Although PE
funds are majority owners, they seemingly do not wish to prioritize board seats as long
as everything is going according to plan. This is also the case when several PE funds
co-invest in portfolio companies.
In terms of CEO turnover we started by examining the total holding period. We find
that performance is an important driver when assessing the whole period. We further
divided the data into two sub periods as we believe the timing of the CEO turnovers
matter. Here we found that in the control period PE firms decide the future of the CEO
on predetermined preferences. Supported by our findings, ROAt-1 does not significantly
explain any of the control changes. This could further imply that PE firms take advantage
of soft information when evaluating the sitting CEO during the control period.
In contrast to control changes, CEO turnover during the monitoring period is highly
based on the CEO’s past performance. The PE firm has now been able to closely monitor
the CEO and should presumably be better suited to evaluate the performance. This is
supported in our findings where ROAt-1 is significant. As the GPs on the board do not
a↵ect changes to the CEO regardless of period, this only amplifies the fact that PE firms
do not intervene through board positions.
In our last analysis we assess how performance is a↵ected. As we are aware of the common
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econometric challenges that are related to these measures, we construct three di↵erent
models. We start by running a static model, but as this model neglects issues regard-
ing endogeneity we further improve it by introducing a dynamic model. The dynamic
model includes the lagged dependent variable as an independent variable. This enables
us to control for past performance and its e↵ect on current measures. We also include
a discussion about the 2SLS model and why we wish to use it, but conclude that our
dynamic model is the preferred one as the instrument was inadequate. Conclusively our
results imply two things. Either the models lack power and are not able to explain any of
the variations seen in ROA, or the models are applicable but do not show any significant
results. Our findings thus suggest that PE firms do not use board positions in order to
induce operational growth, implying that boards do not matter.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Figures
Figure 1: Holding Period
Overview of the total holding period and how it is divided into a control period and a monitoring period. The control
period is from the announcement date prior to the buyout until the first year after the buyout. The monitoring period
extends from the control period until the PE fund has exited, or until 2013 as this is our latest year with observations.
Figure 2: Private Equity Overview
Overview of the two main segments within the Private Equity industry and the resepctive main fields of operations.
Source: Demaria, 2013
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Figure 3: Private Equity Fund Structure
Illustration of how a Private Equity Fund is structured and how the di↵erent entities are connected.
Source: Demaria, 2013
Figure 4: Board Composition Development
This figure shows the development of board composition after a buyout. The transaction takes place at period 0. The
figure shows average total board size, average GPs on the board and average GPs appointed CEO. The averages are
calculated by all buyouts in the data set not exited in the respective period.
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8.2 Tables
Table 1: Definitions and Variable Explanations
This table provides a description of the definitions and abbreviations used throughout the thesis. In addition it includes a
description of the regression variables that are used.
Explanation
LBO Leveraged buyout.
PE Private equity.
GP General partners who manage a fund, representatives from a PE
firm.
LP Investors who invest in a fund.
Holding period The period in which there is at least one PE fund invested in the
portfolio company.
Control period The period from the announcement date until the first year after
the transaction.
Monitoring period The period following the control period until the PE firm(s) exit.
FE Fixed e↵ects.
RE Random e↵ects.
OLS Ordinary least squares.
2SLS Two stage least squares.
Regression Variables Explanation
ROA Return on assets is calculated by dividing total operating income by
total assets. We use this measure to isolate the operational growth
and to to exclude e↵ects as financial impact.
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets.
Firm size Total assets is used as proxy for firm size.
CoInvest A dummy that takes the value of 1 if there are more than one PE
fund invested in the portfolio company, 0 if only one.
NORPE A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the invested PE fund has their
headquarters in Norway, 0 if not.
Exit A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the PE fund exit during the
holding period, 0 if not.
Outsiders The number of external board members on the board the year be-
fore the buyout.
GPs on the Board The percentage of GPs on the Board each year.
CEO Change A dummy that takes the value of 1 if a CEO change occurred during
the total holding period, 0 if not.
CEO Control Change A dummy that takes the value of 1 if a CEO change occurred during
the control period, 0 if not.
CEO Monitoring Change A dummy that takes the value of 1 if a CEO change occurred during
the monitoring period, 0 if not.
GP CEO A dummy that takes the value of 1 if a GP is appointed CEO, 0 if
not.
Industry Dummies A factor variable which contains the six di↵erent industries in the
sample. Consumption, Energy, Health Care, Information and Com-
munication Technology (ICT), Industrial and Other.
Year Dummy A dummy that controls for macroeconomic shocks.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for CEO turnover
Panel A displays the number of companies which had a CEO turnover during the total process of a buyout.
Panel B displays the distribution of CEO turnovers between the control period, monitoring period and the cases where
both occurred.
Panel A: Number of companies who had a CEO turnover
CEO change No CEO change
Buyouts 81 19
Panel B: CEO turnover divided into periods
Control change 52
Monitoring change 68
Control change and monitoring change 34
Total 154
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Table 3: Analysis of Board Composition
In the following table we report the regression coe cients (t-statistics in parentheses) from our Fixed E↵ects and OLS
regressions. The dependent variable is the percentage of GPs on the Board. Leverage is calculated as total debt over total
assets. Firm size is measured by total assets. Exit is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the PE fund has exited.
CoInvest is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if there are more than one PE firm investing in the portfolio company.
NORPE is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the invested PE fund has their headquarters in Norway. Outsiders is the
percentage of external directors on the board prior to the buyout. CEO control change is a dummy that takes the value of
1 if there has been a CEO turnover during the control period. Errors are clustered at firm level. One, two, or three
asterisks mean that the coe cients are significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels respectively.
(1) (2)
GPs on the Board GPs on the Board
Leverage 0.0442* 0.130***
(1.90) (2.98)
Firm size 0.00660 0.0139*
(0.33) (1.67)
Exit -0.121*** -0.184***
(-3.13) (-4.69)
CoInvest -0.00227 0.00196
(-0.04) (0.03)
NORPE 0.00306 -0.0334
(0.04) (-0.43)
Outsiders -0.0968 -0.119
(-0.73) (-1.03)
CEO Control Change 0.00750 0.0922
(0.18) (1.53)
Constant 0.343 -0.00754
(1.57) (-0.04)
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Model Specification Fixed E↵ects OLS
R2 0.105 0.160
Observations 499 499
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Total CEO Turnover
In the following table we report the regression coe cients (t-statistics in parentheses) that a↵ects the change in CEO in
the total holding period. ROAt-1 is the lagged value of ROA calculated by total operating income over total assets.
Leverage is calculated as total debt over total assets. Firm size is measured by total assets. CoInvest is a dummy which
takes the value of 1 if there are more than one PE firm investing in the portfolio company. NORPE is a dummy that takes
the value of 1 if the invested PE fund has their headquarters in Norway. GPs on the board is the fraction of GPs sitting
on the board each year. GP CEO is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if one of the GPs has been appointed the CEO.
Errors are clustered at firm level. One, two, or three asterisks mean that the coe cients are significant at the 10%, 5% or
1% levels respectively.
(1) (2)
Total CEO Turnover Total CEO Turnover
ROAt-1 -0.269*** -0.152**
(-2.93) (-2.26)
Leverage 0.00993 -0.0108
(0.19) (-0.24)
Firm size -0.00820 -0.0166
(-0.19) (-1.33)
CoInvest 0.0335 -0.0801
(0.24) (-0.66)
NORPE 0.307** 0.229**
(2.55) (2.07)
GPs on the Board -0.145 -0.0833
(-1.12) (-1.03)
GP CEO 0.000308 0.00725
(0.01) (0.15)
Constant 0.134 0.0678
(0.22) (0.33)
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Model Specification Fixed E↵ects OLS
R2 0.075 0.063
Observations 499 499
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 5: CEO Control Change
In the following table we report the regression coe cients (t-statistics in parentheses) that a↵ects the change of CEO
during the control period. ROAt-1 is the lagged value of ROA calculated by total operating income over total assets.
Leverage is calculated as total debt over total assets. Firm size is measured by total assets. CoInvest is a dummy which
takes the value of 1 if there are more than one PE firm investing in the portfolio company. NORPE is a dummy that takes
the value of 1 if the invested PE fund has their headquarters in Norway. GPs on the board is the fraction of GPs sitting
on the board each year. GP CEO is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if one of the GPs has been appointed the CEO.
The sample only includes observations which had a control change. Errors are clustered at firm level. One, two, or three
asterisks mean that the coe cients are significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels respectively.
(1) (2)
CEO Control Change CEO Control Change
ROAt-1 0.00248 0.137
(0.02) (1.08)
Leverage -0.241* -0.0559
(-2.04) (-0.59)
Firm size -0.0162 -0.0104
(-0.35) (-0.56)
CoInvest -0.0612 0.0447
(-0.34) (0.37)
NORPE -0.0280 -0.0507
(-0.24) (-0.54)
GPs on the Board -0.0527 0.121
(-0.34) (1.16)
GP CEO 0.0791 0.0384
(0.91) (0.64)
Constant 1.247** 0.485*
(2.08) (1.88)
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Model Specification Fixed E↵ects OLS
R2 0.459 0.330
Observations 161 161
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 6: CEO Monitoring Change
In the following table we report the regression coe cients (t-statistics in parantheses) that a↵ects the change in CEO in
the monitoring period. ROAt-1 is the lagged value of ROA calculated by total operating income over total assets.
Leverage is calculated as total debt over total assets. Firm size is measured by total assets. CoInvest is a dummy which
takes the value of 1 if there are more than one PE firm investing in the portfolio company. NORPE is a dummy that takes
the value of 1 if the invested PE fund has their headquarters in Norway. GPs on the board is the fraction of GPs sitting
on the board each year. GP CEO is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if one of the GPs has been appointed the CEO.
Sample only includes observations which had a monitoring change. Errors are clustered at firm level. One, two, or three
asterisks mean that the coe cients are significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels respectively.
(1) (2)
CEO Monitoring Change CEO Monitoring Change
ROAt-1 -0.312*** -0.209***
(-3.57) (-2.82)
Leverage 0.0218 0.00857
(0.64) (0.19)
Firm size -0.0405 -0.00648
(-1.14) (-0.50)
CoInvest 0.173** 0.0412
(2.41) (0.81)
NORPE 0.101 0.0705
(1.29) (1.41)
GPs on the Board -0.108 -0.0160
(-0.75) (-0.18)
GP CEO -0.144*** -0.0933**
(-2.81) (-2.10)
Constant 0.412 0.145
(0.92) (0.78)
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Model Specification Fixed E↵ects OLS
R2 0.156 0.097
Observations 338 338
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Performance
In the following table we report the regression coe cients (t-statistics in parentheses) from our static model, dynamic
model and 2SLS. The dependent variable is ROA. GPs on the board is the fraction of GPs sitting on the board each year.
In the 2SLS model GPs on the Board is instrumented by the percentage of outsiders on the board prior to the buyout.
Firm size is measured by total assets. Control change is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if there has been a CEO
turnover during this period. Exit is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the PE fund has exited. CoInvest is a dummy
which takes the value of 1 if there are more than one PE firm investing in the portfolio company. NORPE is a dummy
that takes the value of 1 if the invested PE fund has their headquarters in Norway. ROAt-1 is the lagged value of ROA
calculated by total operating income over total assets. Errors are clustered at firm level. One, two, or three asterisks mean
that the coe cients are significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels respectively. In the context of 2SLS R-squared is not
meaningful (Wooldridge, 2010), thus we do not report it.
(1) (2) (3)
ROA ROA ROA
GPs on the Board -0.166 -0.187 -7.199
(-0.91) (-1.01) (-0.36)
Firm size 0.452 0.461 0.372
(1.24) (1.25) (1.25)
Control Change -0.0113 -0.00140 0.198
(-0.14) (-0.02) (0.34)
Exit -0.472 -0.479 -1.537
(-1.13) (-1.14) (-0.52)
CoInvest 0.0360 0.101 -0.186
(0.19) (0.45) (-0.23)
NORPE -0.168 -0.0931 0.298
(-0.74) (-0.54) (0.68)
ROAt-1 -0.381
(-1.05)
Constant -4.728 -4.980
(-1.27) (-1.24)
Year Dummy Yes Yes No
Industry Dummy Yes Yes No
Model Specification Static Dynamic 2SLS
R2 0.134 0.145
Observations 499 499 499
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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